The Multisig Elephant in the Room

Let’s start with the obvious: Blast’s entire infrastructure is governed by a ³⁄₅ multisig wallet with five completely anonymous signers. I’ve traced the contract deployments - first a proxy setup (0xa01 and 0x5f6), then ownership transferred to a Gnosis Safe. Standard practice? Maybe. Alarming when combined with what comes next? Absolutely.

Proxy Contracts: A Double-Edged Sword

The OpenZeppelin UUPSUpgradeable implementation means the multisig can fundamentally alter contract logic at any time. While Optimism and Arbitrum have similar mechanisms, there’s one critical difference - their security councils are known entities with delayed upgrade timelines. Blast? It’s the Wild West with instant execution privileges.

Technical Red Flag #1: The _upgradeTo function gives this anonymous group carte blanche to rewrite the rules.

The $200M Question: Where’s the L2?

Here’s where things get existential. After analyzing the chain:

• No testnet
• No transactions
• No bridge
• No rollup architecture
• No transaction data posted to Ethereum

Blast is effectively a smart wallet that:

1. Takes your ETH/DAI
2. Stakes it via Lido
3. Holds it hostage until…?

The Bridge to Nowhere

The enableTransition function requires setting a mainnetBridge contract that can drain all staked assets. The only check? That it contains some code (not an EOA). Let me emphasize this:

Technical Red Flag #2: A simple 10-line malicious contract could be approved tomorrow to liquidate all $200M+ in deposits.

Compared to Real L2s

Final Verdict

As much as I appreciate innovation, calling this an L2 is like calling a bicycle a spaceship because they both have wheels. Proceed with extreme caution - you’re not interacting with decentralized tech here, but rather trusting faceless strangers with your keys to the kingdom.